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Abstract 
I argue that there could not be grounds on which to introduce God into our 
ontology. My argument presupposes two doctrines. First, we should allow into our 
ontology only what figures in the best explanation of an event or fact. Second, 
explanation is contrastive by nature, in that the explanandum always consists in a 
contrast between a fact and a foil. I argue that God could not figure in true 
contrastive explanatory statements, because the omnipotence of God guarantees 
that for any true proposition p, God could have made it the case that ~p just as 
much as He could have made it the case that p.  
 
 
I 
I argue that there could not be grounds on which to introduce God into our 
ontology. My argument presupposes two doctrines: 
A1: We should allow into our ontology only what figures in the best 
explanation of an event or fact.  
A2: Explanation is contrastive by nature, in that the explanandum always 
consists in a contrast between a fact and a foil.  
I argue that God could not figure in true contrastive explanatory statements, 
because the omnipotence of God guarantees that for any true proposition p, God 
could have made it the case that ~p just as much as He could have made it the case 
that p. I make three further assumptions:  
A3: To be God, a being must be omnipotent. 
A4: For any proposition p, an omnipotent being has the power to make p 
true.  
A5: Citing a cause is always explanatory. 
A3 is accepted by most philosophers of religion, though a few (e.g., James Keller) 
reject it. 
 A4 is rejected by most philosophers of religion. For example, propositions 
like Ǯ͞ + ͞ = ͠ǯ and Ǯ͞ + ͞ = ͡ǯ seem to be examples of propositions that cannot be 
made true even by an omnipotent being. Therefore, I shall restrict A4 to 
contingent propositions. That is, omnipotence entails the power to make true, at 
most, all contingent propositions. Indeed, this is true on the best available current 
theories of omnipotence.1  
A5, unlike A1-A͠, is not essential to the paperǯs main argument. )nstead, ) 
use it in order to answer an objection without making a commitment to the thesis 
that all explanation is causal.2 
 
                                                 
 
1
 Further issues are raised by propositions that are true due to an act of free will. God cannot make  
 such propositions true if there is genuine libertarian freedom. Similarly, propositions about the 
past: although it is contingent that Germany lost World War II, God cannot now make this false. I 
shall not pursue these complications here.   
 2 A possible counterexample to A5 is presented by chance events: in the case of chance events (e.g., 
a car hits my aunt) we can have a cause (the car with its velocity and the position of Aunty), but we 
do not have an explanation ȋat least not one ǲof the right kindǳȌ. ) owe this point to Benedikt 
Göcke. 
II 
Since Quine, the following ontological principle has seen much popularity: we 
should accept as existing only those entities which are postulated in the best 
explanation of what we accept to be the case. It follows that we have good reason 
to believe that x exists only if x has some some explanatory power: only those 
entities the postulation of which is necessary for explaining something should be 
believed to exist.3 I will argue that appeal to God is always explanatorily impotent.  
For us to be justified in accepting the existence of God, the postulation of 
God must have some explanatory significance. A common argument for the non-
existence of God is that there is nothing the (best) explanation of which requires 
the postulation of God. This was Laplaceǯs line when he told Napoleon that he did 
not believe in God because he had Ǯno need for that hypothesis.ǯ4 
It has often been assumed that a canonical explanandum consists of a single 
event or fact. More recently, however, Peter Lipton has claimed that a canonical 
explanandum is a Ǯcontrastive phenomenonǯ: a pair consisting in a fact and a foil.5 
A fully specified explanatory statement does not take the form Ǯp explains why qǯ, 
                                                 
 3 ǲOnly ifǳ rather than ǲif and only ifǳ because the latter would entail that we have eo ipso good 
 reasons to believe that any x with explanatory power exists, which is absurd.  
4 Strictly speaking, Laplace was here concerned with whether one needs God as a hypothesis in 
natural science, not whether we need God in other contexts. This is also the vein of Russellǯs Ǯteapot 
atheismǯ: there is no more evidence for the existence of God – no more explananda calling out for 
the postulation of God – than there is for the existence of a miniature China teapot orbiting the 
sun. See Bertrand Russell, Ǯ)s There a God?ǯ in The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Volume 11: 
Last Philosophical Testament, ed. J. G. Slater and P. Köllner, (London: Routledge, 1997). 
5 Peter Lipton, ǮContrastive Explanationǯ in D. Knowles ȋed.Ȍ, Explanation and its Limits, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).  
but rather the form Ǯp explains why q rather than rǯ.6 In its minimal form, an 
explanatory statement would be Ǯp explains why q rather than ~qǯ. 
Let us further assume that one way to explain something (e.g., a contrastive 
phenomenon) is by citing its cause – what brought it about or made it the case. 
The assumption is that causal explanation is a genuine and legitimate kind of 
explanation. This is much weaker than holding a causal account of explanation, 
according to which all or most explanation is causal.7 The claim is merely that 
citing of a cause is explanatory.  
Some contrastive explanatory statements are therefore causal statements. 
They are statements of the form Ǯp caused q rather than rǯ, or at least Ǯp caused q 
rather than ~qǯ, Such a statement may be ambiguous as between Ǯp caused q rather 
than causing rǯ and Ǯp caused q-rather-than-rǯ. That is, there is an ambiguity 
between a contrast of causation and a causation of contrast. But this ambiguity will 
not matter for present purposes. 
Many theists will reject this approach to explanation in favour of (say) the 
deductive-nomological or holistic models of explanation. Hence I shall now say a 
few words on why this approach to explanation is good on independent grounds. 
The central thesis of the contrastive approach to explanation is that 
requests for an explanation are explicitly or implicitly contrastive. They have the 
                                                 
6 Liptonǯs favourite example is the following. Liptonǯs three-year old son throws the food on the 
floor. When asked to explain his misdeed, the child says that he was not hungry anymore. This 
explains why the child threw the food on the floor rather than eat it, but it does not explain why he 
threw the food on the floor rather than leave it in his plate. 
7 David Lewis, ǮCausal Explanationǯ in his Philosophical Papers, Volume 2, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1986). 
form ǮWhy p rather than q?ǯ, rather than simply ǮWhy p?ǯ. When the contrast 
remains implicit, it is obvious in the context in which the question is posed. 
Moreover, what counts as an explanatory cause depends not just on fact p but also 
on the foil q. Thus Ǯthe increase in temperature might be a good explanation of 
why the mercury in a thermometer rose rather than fell, but not a good 
explanation of why it rose rather than breaking the glassǯ (Lipton 2001: 48). Not all 
of pǯs causes explain p in a given context; the foil in a contrastive question partially 
determines which causes are explanatory and which are not. A good explanation 
requires a cause that made the difference between the fact and foil. Thus the fact 
that ǮSmith had syphilis may explain why he rather than Jones contracted paresis 
(a form of partial paralysis), if Jones did not have syphilis; but it will not explain 
why Smith rather than Doe contracted paresis, if Doe also had syphilisǯ (Lipton 
2001: 49). Contrastive explanations bring out the way in which what makes a 
difference between pǯs occurring or not depends on what we mean by p not 
occurring, on our choice of foil. In so doing, it seems also to support the idea that 
the reason (some) causes are explanatory is that they identify what made the 
salient difference between the occurrence and non-occurrence of the effect of 
interest. Theories of explanation (such as the deductive-nomological or holistic 
models) which leave the contrastive structure of explanation unspecified are 
therefore greatly incomplete models of explanation.  
We are now in a position to see why appeal to God is always explanatorily 
impotent. Because, by A3, God is omnipotent, there is no possible fact, event, or 
state of affairs He would be unable to bring about. And by A4, there is no 
contingent proposition He could not make true. Moreover, His infinite power 
implies that differences in the effort required on Godǯs part to bring about 
different states of affairs are negligible. It follows that for any true contingent 
proposition p, ǮGod caused pǯ ȋOr ǮGod caused it to be the case that pǯȌ is just as 
plausible as ǮGod caused ~pǯ ȋOr ǮGod caused it to be the case that ~pǯȌ. That is, for 
any true contingent proposition p, citing God is just as good a causal explanation 
of p as of ~p. 
This creates a principled problem for employing God in contrastive 
explanation. Statements of the form ǮGod explains why p rather than ~pǯ can never 
be true, because citing God can never account for the contrast between p and ~p. 
)ronically, then, it is Godǯs omnipotence that makes (im explanatorily impotent. 
Godǯs omnipotence entails that for any proposition p, God can equally easily make 
it to be that p (rather than ~p) and that ~p (rather than p), thereby explaining it, 
since, by A5, causal explanation is a variety of explanation. Therefore, for any 
proposition we might seek to explain, God could serve equally well to explain both 
it and its contradictory, and so God would never add any explanatory value to a 
theory. Therefore, by A1, we are not possibly licensed in admitting God into our 
ontology.  
 
 
III 
I now turn to consider four objections to this argument.  
First, it might be objected that even though appeal to God cannot figure in 
contrastive causal explanation, it can still figure in different forms of explanation.  
One reply would be to embrace the thesis that all explanation is causal. But 
that is unnecessary. Even if p can be explained non-causally whereas ~p cannot, it 
remains the case that ~p can be explained causally, since everything can be 
explained causally by appeal to Godǯs doings. So for any proposition, some 
explanation of its negation by appeal to God would be available. 
Second, it might be claimed that the argument commits a verificationist 
fallacy. It may show that we cannot establish whether God actually brought it 
about that p or that ~p. From this it does not follow, however, that there is no fact 
of the matter as to whether God brought it about that p or that ~p. 
This objection is an ignoratio elenchi. The above argument is not supposed 
to show that God does not exist. Rather, it purports to show that there is not – or 
more accurately, could not – be reason to believe that He does. That is, the claim is 
that belief in the existence of God is epistemically unjustified. The argument does 
not impose a verificationist constraint on truth or reality, though it may impose a 
verificationist constraint on justification. 
Third, if one grants A1-A4, then the most obvious objection to the argument 
is that God may have reasons to cause p rather than ~p and he brings about p and 
so some statements of the form ǮGod explains p rather than ~pǯ can be true after 
all. That is, although God could cause anything, it does not follow that He would. 
God may have good reasons for preferring the obtaining of p over the obtaining of 
~p, and act on those reasons. Another way of putting the point is this: If we are 
asked ǮWhy p rather than ~p?ǯ, it seems perfectly proper to answer: ǮBecause God 
had preferred p to ~p and consequently chose to bring about p.ǯ 
However, in the proposed explanations, the appeal to God does no 
explanatory work. Instead, the appeal to the reasons attributed to God (and his 
choosing to act on them) does the explanatory work and that appeal just 
presupposes Godǯs existence and so gives us no reason to introduce God into our 
ontology. 
In reply, it might be said that the reasons God has for preferring p to ~p do 
not all by themselves cause p to be true rather than ~p. So Godǯs existence is surely 
an essential component of the causal explanation of why p is true rather than ~p. 
The reasons God has for bringing about p rather than ~p do not do any explanatory 
work on their own; they help explain something p only insofar as God has these 
reasons and brings about p for those reasons. Godǯs existence is an essential 
constituent in this explanation.  Insofar as God’s acting for reason R is the result of 
an inference to the best explanation, this appeal does not seem so much to 
presuppose Godǯs existence as to provide grounds for positing Godǯs existence.  
(owever, we must distinguish between the Ǯwhatǯ component of a causal 
explanation and the Ǯwhyǯ component. )n the explanation in question, God is the 
answer to the question ǮWhat caused p?ǯ, while the reasons attributed to God (and 
his choosing to act on them) are the answer to the question ǮWhy did God cause p 
rather than ~p?ǳ So, since explanations are answers to why questions, it is the 
reasons ȋand Godǯs acting on themȌ that do all the explanatory work. That is, what 
explains the fact that p rather than ~p is the fact that God has the reasons He does 
(and chooses to act on them). But that explanation already presupposes that there 
is a God. What we are still missing is an explanatory context in which God might 
be introduced into our ontology in the first place. )f we are asked ǮWhy p rather 
than ~p?ǯ, it is no more acceptable to answer: ǮBecause God preferred p to ~p and 
consequently chose to bring about pǯ than it would be to identify Janeǯs husband as 
her murderer on the grounds that Janeǯs husband preferred Jane dead rather than 
alive and consequently chose to murder Jane unless we already have an explanatory 
context in which Jane’s husband is included in our ontology in the first place. 
ǮBecause Janeǯs husband preferred Jane dead and consequently chose to murder 
herǯ has no explanatory power in respect of Janeǯs death unless it is already 
justifiably believed that Jane has a husband.  
Or to put it another way: when astronomers infer the existence of a planet 
from a telltale wobble in the star it orbits, it would indeed be bizarre to challenge 
the explanation on the grounds that it is certain of the planets properties (its mass, 
orbital path, distance from the star) that do the explanatory work, while the 
existence of the planet is presupposed — consequently, the proffered explanation 
gives us no reason to introduce the planet into our ontology.8 But that is because 
we already have planets in our ontology and have observed their effects. We 
                                                 
 8 This is the chief method by which astronomers discover exoplanets. 
already know planets exist. We do not already know God exists. To be a candidate 
for a cause we must already believe in entities of the relevant sort.  
A fourth objection arises in connection with the modified version of A5. 
Given this restriction on Godǯs omnipotence, the following problem arises. Many 
theists seek to include God in their ontology on the ground that He explains 
necessary truths. Leibniz, for example, argued that, since mathematical truths 
were necessary and eternal, they required a necessary and eternal truthmaker, viz. 
Godǯs )deas. )ndependent of the plausibility of such an argument, it is not ruled 
out by my argument when we account for the proper restrictions on Divine 
omnipotence. Given the possible need for explaining necessary truths, therefore, 
the argument fails.  
My reply is twofold. First, many theists seek to introduce God on the basis 
of contingent considerations alone. Second, it is impossible for an agent (even an 
omnipotent agent) to bring about a necessary state of affairs (e.g., that all cubes are 
shaped) or make necessary truths necessary. It is possible for an agent, a, to make a 
necessary truth, p, necessary, only if possibly, (1) a brings about p and (2) if a had 
not acted, then p would have been false. Because a necessary truth is necessary 
whether or not anyone acts, (2) is false. Therefore, it is impossible for an agent to 
make a necessary truth necessary. 
 
IV 
I conclude that appeal to God is explanatorily impotent, and necessarily so, given 
the contrastive structure of explanation. This means that there could be no 
grounds on which to introduce God into our ontology. This argument neutralizes 
all a posteriori theistic arguments from the get-go: none can, in principle, license 
belief in God.9 
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